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57 pages 1 hour read

Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity

Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 1989

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Themes

Gender As Performative

Say that you tell your friend, “I promise to be there for you.” Your statement isn’t so much about what’s going to happen in the future as it is you saying something that is designed to transform how your friend sees you in that moment. The promising itself is the action in this sentence, but it is a special kind of action that creates itself through your speech. It's just like saying "I do," during the marriage ceremony—saying the words is the action that makes the marriage real. Promising and saying "I do" are performative utterances in that they are both instances in which doing/saying something creates the reality of that something. In Gender Trouble, Judith Butler takes much the same approach to describing gender by claiming it is performative, rather than expressive. Gender is not something we are, but something we do.

Butler’s notion of gender as performative is rooted in several insights she derives from her examination of theory—the constructedness of sex, the constructedness of gender, and her notion that language, culture, prohibitions, and power are the shaping forces of identity, not some essence that is simply inside of us, waiting to be expressed through the wearing of a dress or the batting of eyelashes.

Throughout the three chapters of the work, Butler uses painstaking analysis and questioning to show that there is never a moment when bodies that we see as masculine or feminine are free of preconceptions that make us see them as such. These preconceptions are so deeply baked into our perceptions of reality that we cannot even see them in most cases. People are commonly accustomed to associating breasts with women or mustaches with men, for example, but those associations are arbitrary ways of seeing that what has been culturally established is therefore seemingly natural—there are people recognized as women without having breasts, and it would seem silly to claim that shaving a mustache would make one cease to be recognized as a man. Every aspect of the body, however, is subject to the same arbitrary association with being a woman or man, including the genitals.

Gender associations with masculinity and femininity are also arbitrary and constructed. Consider, for example, how horrified older Americans were when young women began cutting their hair into short bobs in the early 20th century. In American culture, up until that point, short hair was mostly considered masculine or a defect, while long hair was taken to be the hallmark of femininity, a woman’s crowning glory. Nowadays, of course, the pixie cut or bob is seen as quite standard.

What we recognize as feminine has changed because our perception of what is allowed to be in the repertoire of femininity has changed. There is nothing natural or essential about long hair as feminine, for example. If we do try to find the prototype of perfect, long-haired, heterosexual femininity we never find it, not in our genes and not on our bodies. There is no original. What we might find, instead, is that affluent women had the time and means to keep up long hair, and so long hair as feminine became the standard as determined by that dominant group. We might find that women who were members of the dominant racial group in society tended to have long hair, and thus to have long hair was to, in appearance at least, to be someone who counts for something—a woman—in a society maintained to serve the needs of that dominant group. There’s a shared, traceable history and set of social relations that shape what gets in the repertoire, in other words.

Based on our inability to find some essence of sex and gender, Butler concludes that gender is what we do, when we do it. Butler uses the example of drag to show what she means by “performative.” When we look at a person in drag, that person is “womaning” in a particular way—dress, gestures, color applied to the face, lips, or nails. How that person does gender is not free of conventions of gender in that particular time and place, or else the audience will fail to recognize what that person is doing as womaning. At the same time, somewhere in there is a body that more than likely bears secondary sexual traits we associate with masculine or feminine bodies, unless the person is intersex.

In this situation, the actions of that person and the possible body under there don’t necessarily match up in a conventional way. Butler points out that actually, even if they did, our notion of them matching up is preconditioned by our shared sense of what is in the repertoire of womaning. Therefore, in every instance when a person is womaning—whether that style of womaning matches up with the gender assigned to that person at birth or not, what engenders that person, and shapes our perception of the gender reality of that person in that particular moment, is what that person is doing, not something inside that person that just naturally comes out.

Butler’s theorization of gender as performative had and has important political and social implications. Seeing gender as performative is significant because it allows for people to conceive of and accept many more ways of doing gender than masculine or feminine. The idea that gender is not an expression of naturally-sexed bodies but rather is born out of culture, discourse, social relations, and power is also important, because it means that we can find the history of gendering and engage with that repertoire of gendering in ways that are less prescriptive or even less harmful, especially in cases when one’s gendering is marginalized or even the pretext for violence or oppression from dominant groups.

Feminism and Queer Theory

Butler's primary theoretical engagement is with feminism—the social, historical, cultural, academic, and political movement to claim equality for women.

In the United States, feminism went through several periods during which the movement emphasized different aims: the first wave (19th-to-early-20th-century), which focused on securing basic rights such at the right to vote or own property; the second wave (1960s and 1970s), which focused on extending rights such an ending workplace discrimination and sought to establish frameworks for talking about an essential women's experience; and the third wave (1990s), which challenged the idea that there was any such thing as an essential women's experience.

There is substantial debate about this particular way of describing feminism's history and subsequent shifts in feminism since the 1990s, but such an account can be helpful in understanding Butler's sense of urgency in rejecting the idea of a stable identity called women. Gender Trouble, published in 1990, can be read as a young, lesbian feminist's rejection of second-wave feminism, particularly of some of its exclusionary practices that devalued the experiences and perspectives of women of color and queer people. Butler's call for making space for the voices of all kinds of genders outside of the binary of masculine/feminine played an important role in consolidating queer theory, which goes beyond focusing on women to focus on theorizing gender with relation to gay, lesbian, and transgender identities (and beyond).

Several other aspects of feminism as represented by Butler are reflected in more recent controversies and challenges to North American feminism. Attempts to form coalitions of North American feminists, including the Women's March Movement, have struggled mightily to create an intersectional feminism that decenters the experience of white, affluent women. In addition, the exclusionary practices of feminists who reject transwomen's right to function in spaces and platforms designated for women seem to bear out Butler's concern that holding on to a stable body gendered and sexed as feminine would eventually lead to inequality thriving in feminism's midst.

Finally, Butler's engagement with French feminism and her warning that relying on nonwestern cultures as fodder for making arguments about woman as a universal category gestures towards the more nuanced understanding of feminism in an international context.

Making Trouble

Butler closes Chapter 1 with this statement: “This text continues, then, as an effort to think through the possibility of subverting and displacing those naturalized and reified notions of gender that support masculine hegemony and heterosexist power, to make gender trouble” (46). Although queer studies, gender studies, feminist studies, and French theory are now seen as essential parts of various academic disciplines, at the time Butler wrote Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, some of these fields did not exist as recognized disciplines. Others had not gained enough currency in academia to even be assured of funding and professorships for people doing academic work in these areas. Butler makes trouble in any number of ways, but most particularly in her attack on feminist politics based on a shared identity, her voice as a writer, and her focus on formulating what eventually became queer studies.

The opening gambit in Butler’s discussion is to critique the most basic assumptions of the prevailing model of feminism at that time. During the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the work of organizing women had largely been based on consolidating around an identity called “women” that somehow managed to transcend differences in race, ethnicity, culture, history, class, and geography. The idea that solidarity around this idea was necessary to advance a pro-woman political agenda was very prevalent, and one can still see this idea at work in contemporary efforts to organize women politically or advance the political ambitions of female candidates.

When Butler argues that there is no such thing as women, that bodies are culturally constructed (not just gender), that there is no need for identity-based solidarity, and that attempts at subversion based on these myths are doomed to failure, her target is feminism itself, not just “masculinist power” (46). As influential as her text is on feminism and gender studies, it reads in retrospect as an audacious proclamation that important North American feminists had been doing feminism all wrong. The commitment to liberating all women and emancipatory rhetoric are foundational to how feminism identifies itself; some of the acrid responses to Gender Trouble make it clear that the criticism was particularly painful.

Another way Butler makes trouble is with her diction. Her writing is notoriously difficult to comprehend at times, and it is so dense with references to other theories that unpacking a sentence or a paragraph can be quite daunting unless one knows or looks up the names and ideas included. Butler has even been used as a negative example of the inaccessibility of academic writing. Butler’s justified response to these criticisms was to point out that there was nothing virtuous about accessible text. Why shouldn’t people work hard to understand something that is as complex and important as gender? One can argue that Butler’s work is recognized as brilliant based on the awards she received for this work in particular. Her kind of writing earned her prestigious academic positions and ushered in a moment in academia in which using theory in this way was lauded. Her troublemaking paid off.

Finally, one of the enduring ways that Butler makes trouble is in by pointing out that feminism perpetuates inequality, despite its supposed goal of advancing equality. One of the most damning critiques Butler lodges against feminism is that its formulations of gender at the time were riddled with heterosexism (and still are in some quarters). Butler’s critique of Julia Kristeva, a highly-respected figure for feminists, is supported with direct quotes that prove the heterosexism and her inability to see lesbian gender identity as legitimate, for example. Her critique is ultimately in the service of carving out a speaking position for queer identity, though, and indeed, her work is now regularly included as an important text for feminist, queer, and gender studies.

False Binaries

As a troublemaker, Butler tends to focus on showing that the way we think about certain accepted categories or ideas are actually inconsistent or incoherent. The process of revealing the inconsistency or incoherence of such binaries is an important strategy for deconstruction and reflects the influence of poststructuralism on her work. Her focus in much of the work is to deconstruct binaries and to uncover the specific history of things we just assume to be natural.

A binary is a conceptual pair, such as man/woman, masculine/feminine, mind/body, being/having, or child/woman. Depending upon your culture of origin, it may be obvious that the elements in a binary can almost always be viewed in terms of a hierarchy. In western culture, for example, the body is almost always seen as subordinate to the mind, since western culture values rationality, which is thought to reside in the mind.

When one examines any such pair closely, it’s almost always the case that the binary is a false one, and one that exaggerates the difference between the elements of the pair or even conceals that the two are virtually the same. Butler’s examination of gender and sex, for example, reveals that claiming gender is cultural and sex is natural conceals the fact that both are constructions and closely related to the mind/body binary. Allowing the false binary to stay in place almost always conceals the way social relations and power act to establish hierarchies that benefit or perpetuate inequality in a system or society. For example, there have been periods of history when women and people of color were associated with the body, and in a system in which the mind is seen as more important than the body, such an association was used to reinforce racist and sexist ideas that justified oppression.

Butler’s consistent deconstruction of binaries assumes great potency when she applies Foucault's critique of the repressive hypothesis to the heterosexual/homosexual binary. An explanation for the ability of a system of compulsive heterosexuality to also generate its supposed opposite, homosexuality, is missing from many of the accounts of gender-identity formation that Butler critiques. Using Foucault’s insight on how repression works, however, Butler concludes that every prohibition generates the very thing it is supposed to repress. Compulsory heterosexuality cannot exist, cannot create an inside/outside, without having a polluted other whose exclusion makes possible the claim to an identity.

Another important binary that Butler deconstructs is masculine/feminine. Butler ultimately believes that the proliferation of different genders will subvert the oppressive power of compulsory heterosexuality. After Wittig and Irigaray, Butler argues that this particular binary conceals both the asymmetry in power between men and women and the interdependence of each term on the other for meaning. Once that binary is finally revealed for what it is, genders that do not fit within the binary can finally be named and accepted; this proliferation of genders is especially important for Butler as a person, who focuses on making space for gay and lesbian voices to be heard. Her commitment to the proliferation of genders is one of her key contributions to feminism and queer studies.

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