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Summary
Chapter Summaries & Analyses
Key Figures
Themes
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Important Quotes
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Sontag writes that “[t]o catch a death actually happening and embalm it for all time is something only cameras can do,” and that many such photographs are beyond suspicion; but then she shows exactly how and why deaths have been “staged,” from Vietnam (59) to Cambodia (60) to Cuba (by Teddy Roosevelt with his Rough Riders, no less, in the first newsreel of battle (63-4)).Some are made more dramatic and others to suppress the true terror. Both goals are in the name of patriotism.
These points lead Sontag to bring up the first ban on press photography at the front (during World War I) and also censorship—by the military, TV networks, or photographers themselves. That censorship can hinge on good taste when our culture is “saturated with commercial incentives to lower standards of taste” (68) or the rights of relatives of the deceased.
Sontag shows us that this respect for survivors of the dead, or even any compassionate spectator, in looking upon brutal images, is amazingly relative. “The more remote or exotic the place,” she tells us, the more likely we are to have full frontal views of the dead and dying” (70). Victims of famine, genocide, or civil wars in postcolonial Africa get registered in Western photography as par for the course, as anonymous evidence of collective horror to be taken for granted. Maimed or starved subjects are stripped of all dignity in our viewing habits, which include the age-old practice of gawking at the exotic. Sontag quotes Shakespeare’s The Tempest as Trinculo imagines Caliban put on exhibit in London: “[…] When they will not give a doit [a coin] to relieve a lame beggar, they will lay out ten to see a dead Indian” (72).
Even before Western culture had a written language, it had representations of brutality. In fact, Homer’s war stories and Da Vinci’s battle paintings challenged their audiences to partake in a strange kind of beauty, but one that seems “heartless” through the lens of the camera, Sontag notes (75-76). Consensus holds that art transforms, while photography bears witness. Yet Sontag contends, “The dual powers of photography—to generate documents and to create works of art—have produced some remarkable exaggerations about what photographers ought and ought not to do” (76).
Paradoxically, we assume that artfulness distracts from suffering; likewise, captions must report, not interpret. Aesthetics drain our compassion. Yet the photograph “gives mixed signals” to the viewer: “Stop this, it urges. But it also exclaims, What a spectacle!” (77). The epic scope of a Salgado photograph looks all-pervading, overwhelming, and finally beyond the realm of empathy. Yet Sontag argues that throughout Western history, the spectacular has drawn compassion through art.
As for building a sense of our recent past, Sontag declares that “there is no such thing as collective memory—part of the same family of spurious notions as collective guilt. But there is collective instruction” (85). While photographs “objectify” by turning an event or a person into something that can be possessed, memory is individual and dies with each person” (86). Yet we do stipulate which representative images we will “own” (the mushroom cloud of the atomic bomb test or Martin Luther King speaking at the Lincoln Memorial) to build the stories we remember; they form a shared ideology.
However, we do not remember through photographs so much as we remember the photographs themselves, which “eclipse” other forms of understanding (89). Here is another crucial difference between pictures and stories: “Narratives can make us understand: photographs do something else: they haunt us” (89). For example, Ron Haberle’s documentation of the My Lai massacre of 1968 haunted viewers because “there was something to be done, right now” (91), the idea being that the war could have been stopped.
Sontag returns to the issue of the obligation to look at photographs of assault and misery, demanding that the spectator not only peruse them but ask why it’s important to regard such brutality, and what can be learned from such works. After all, she explains, “[n]ot all reactions to these pictures are under the supervision of reason and conscience” (95). Car accidents turn our heads even as they repulse us. The quandary first appears in Plato (here a precursor to Freud) as he contemplates reason, anger, and desire (98).
A gruesome image of brutality in a 1910 photograph of a prisoner in China obsessed modernist philosopher George Bataille in 1961, whose contemplation of it brought on “both a mortification of the feelings and a liberation of tabooed erotic knowledge” (98). Attraction to such images can serve a variety of needs: to stave off weakness, to numb feelings, to admit the existence of what cannot be changed. Bataille, within a religious paradigm, links suffering to sacrifice, which then leads to exaltation, but not as suffering that demands to be reversed or undone or at least rejected.
Despite the voyeuristic attraction, it may be normal for people to dodge dwelling on the misery of others: “Wherever people feel safe […] they will be indifferent” (100). An onslaught of media images can lead to detachment; helplessness and fear also play a role in becoming shut down to scenes of violence. People resist horror when they feel helpless to prevent it: “Compassion is an unstable emotion. It needs to be translated into action, or it withers” (101).
“There is no war without photography,” Sontag claims, an idea previously noted by Ernst Jünger in 1930 (66). The camera is a gun: both “shoot” the subject, only differently. Candor in composing the frame comes with distance, not spatial but ideological (the perception of others’ “difference” from us). Proximity to the subject (to those like “us”) begs for discretion through the camera eye. Images of those near or familiar to us bring Sontag to create the term, “double-lens story,” in which the onlooker suffers not only the recognition of the subject but also, as a survivor or mourner, through the “magnifying glass” of emotion, an indecency of information overload (63).
Sontag takes us behind the scenes. Censorship of execution photography can be more than meets the eye, such as in the case of Daniel Pearl in Karachi and the video coverage of his beheading, which was banned. His wife saw it as too brutal to suffer relentlessly and the press apparently deferred to her, but it is also a fact that adjoining footage of the Israeli slaughter of Palestinian children and then Bush and Sharon at the White House issuing threats and demands gave away too much context for Pearl’s murder for the video to be released.
Sontag sums up her examination of the double standard of viewing (and feeling) by likening the Western gaze upon victims in poor, former colonies to the behavior of onlookers at a London zoo (indeed, Africans themselves were exhibited as attractions at one time). Sontag writes that “the other, even when not an enemy, is regarded only as someone to be seen, not someone (like us) who also sees” (72). Then there is, conversely, all that Western powers refuse to see, such as the weaponry Americans used against Vietnam, entirely disproportionate to that of Vietnamese guerrilla tactics, violating the laws of war (94). It was the first time in war photography, notes Sontag, that the compelling obligation of the individual spectator to act was not counterbalanced by the distance and presumed powerlessness of the subject.
Sontag turns to the work of a Brazilian, Sebastião Salgado, to discuss the “exploitation of sentiment” in war photography. Salgado is criticized (however unjustly) for composing panoramic photographs of human misery on a scale that looks “cinematic” (a suspicious accusation, according to Sontag). He shows suffering as representative (according to work type, ethnic group, and nature of distress). Yet globalizing suffering on such a scale can seem to pre-empt the possibility of intervention and, therefore, compassion.
When people feel useless and helpless in contemplating photographs of disaster and pain, they begin to get apathetic, Sontag explains. While some believe that it is image overload that prevents the willingness to look at pain, Sontag insists, “it is passivity that dulls feeling” (102). The moral and emotional anesthesia that looks inert is really raging with frustration, but that does not mean that sympathy can really serve as a link between those in the midst of pain, far away, and those observing that pain on large or small screens. Images are the spark—thinking and hard work need to follow.
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By Susan Sontag