52 pages • 1 hour read
Summary
Background
Chapter Summaries & Analyses
Key Figures
Themes
Index of Terms
Important Quotes
Essay Topics
Further Reading & Resources
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Keller addresses another common objection to Christianity, namely the question of how evil could exist in a world ruled by a God who is both all-good and all-powerful. Against the apparent force of this objection, Keller responds by saying that many philosophers no longer accept its validity and, further, that the existence of evil and suffering actually helps to prove the existence of God.
One fallacy inherent in the objection is that it assumes that everything defined as “evil” must either be pointless or contrary to the purposes of a good God, but this is by no means an easy thing to establish: “Just because you can’t see or imagine a good reason why God might allow something to happen doesn’t mean there can’t be one” (23). Keller invites his readers to consider some of the suffering in their own lives, believing that they will acknowledge that, at least in some cases, the perspective of time and growth has enabled them to see the possibility of there being a reason for that pain. If that is so, he argues, then why would it be impossible to imagine that an infinite God might allow all the kinds of suffering we see and do it for purposes that are not yet apparent to us?
Keller further contends that our predisposition to believe that evil ought not to happen is itself a signpost pointing to God. If the universe were governed by random chance and natural causation alone, then we would not perceive evil as evil, but as a series of random but unfortunate events. The fact that we are surprised, shocked, or repulsed by evil suggests that we inherently know that things ought not to be this way, a belief that Keller asserts is only logically possible if grounded in a universal morality such as the one God provides.
Keller also points out that in the Christian tradition, God is not simply a distant majesty who allows evil to happen while remaining unmoved by our suffering. Rather, Christianity shows a God who is so concerned about the problem of evil and the pain of human suffering that he entered into humanity’s story to take that suffering upon himself: “Christianity alone among the world religions claims that God became uniquely and fully human […] and therefore knows firsthand despair, rejection, loneliness, poverty, bereavement, torture, and imprisonment” (30). By offering himself as a sacrifice on the cross, Jesus Christ shows just how seriously God takes human suffering: “God takes our misery and suffering so seriously that he was willing to take it on himself” (31). In addition, the doctrine of the resurrection following the crucifixion of Jesus proclaims that God will ultimately provide the answer for all the suffering this world endures.
One of the most common objections Keller relates from his years of ministry is the belief that Christianity is too restrictive and exclusive. Many people appear to believe that communities should be completely inclusive rather than restricting membership on matters of individual beliefs and practices. Keller argues that this objection may sound nice but is impossible in practice, as all communities are defined by their boundaries, or else they would cease to be communities at all: “Every human community holds in common some beliefs that necessarily create boundaries, including some people and excluding others from its circle” (39).
Another common objection that Keller relates is the belief that Christianity is culturally rigid, narrowly reflecting a Western/Euro-American heritage. This objection, however, is simply untrue. It may reflect a popular perception, Keller writes, but it reflects neither the facts of Christianity’s historical experience nor its present cultural realities. Major wings of Christianity have been rooted in Middle Eastern, Asian, and African contexts from the religion’s earliest days and remain present and flourishing today. The demographic center of Christianity currently is not Europe or North America, but Latin America, Africa, and east Asia. Christianity has proven itself culturally adaptable to all of these various contexts, far more so than most other religions: “Contrary to popular opinion, then, Christianity is not a Western religion that destroys local cultures. Rather, Christianity has more culturally diverse forms than other faiths” (46).
Even on a personal level, Keller presents Christianity as a liberating influence rather than a restrictive one. It asks its believers to adapt their habits and practices in accordance with its belief structure, but this is no different than one would expect. If Christianity is, at its heart, a relationship with God, then Keller suggests that it will affect our behavior as any relationship does, calling for adjustments and sacrifices in order to experience the greater liberation of love.
In this chapter, Keller acknowledges that many of our feelings for or against Christianity are predicated on our previous experience of it. If our experience is of vain, judgmental Christians who are unconcerned with the suffering of others, we will likely require more and stronger proof than someone who has experienced Christians who are loving, gentle, and motivated by the causes of justice and peace in the world. This diversity of outcomes among the sort of Christians one might encounter, however, does not constitute a valid argument against Christianity.
On the question of whether Christianity causes religious violence, Keller admits the historical fact that such occurrences have happened but says that in Christianity’s case, such things go against the clear and explicit teachings of the religion’s founder and thus ought to be regarded less as an attribute of Christianity than an attribute of human sinfulness more generally. All societies tend to transcendentalize their highest values, and this includes a temptation to impose those values on other people—a pattern that is as true of secular societies as it is of Christianity. Within recent history, it has been atheist societies that have been guilty of far more ideological violence than Christian societies, so the conclusion appears to be that ideologically motivated violence is attributable to human nature, not to any one religion.
Keller also points out that Christianity has a unique tradition of self-critique that is rooted in its own sacred texts. When someone is taking Christian values or doctrines as a pretext for un-Christian actions, other Christians have recourse to the canon of biblical scriptures to correct that behavior in a clear and compelling way. Within the Bible itself, this self-critique of the community is seen in both the Israelite prophets in the Old Testament and in Jesus’s ministry in the New Testament. A balanced view of Christianity, then, would acknowledge not only the places where Christians have used Christian rhetoric as a pretext for injustice but also the far broader tradition in which Christians have used their values and their capacity for self-critique to stand against great social evils, from slavery to genocide.
This section, representing the central content of Part 1 of The Reason for God, continues Keller’s thematic focus on Addressing Objections to Christianity. The objections represented in this section are varied and more extensive than the chapter titles alone might suggest. For instance, Chapter 3 addresses its title to a single objection—that Christianity is a straitjacket—but upon closer inspection, the chapter is a collection of several different objections clustered around a single theme: Christianity’s perceived burden of limitations and exclusions directed toward outsiders, toward other cultures, and even toward the believer’s personal experience. The objections in these three chapters appear to be ordered not by their content, but by the frequency with which Keller encounters them in the course of his pastoral ministry.
In most cases, Keller’s tactics for addressing objections follow a pattern of several steps. First, should the situation call for it, Keller acknowledges the merits of the objection and sympathizes with the position of those who offer it. He gives the skeptics the benefit of the doubt and tends to attribute noble motives to them, rather than being accusatory or dismissive.
Second, Keller addresses any misunderstandings of Christian doctrine that might be at the root of the objection. If he can clear up a misperception that caused the objection, then Keller simply moves ahead, assuming this to be a sufficient answer. This second tactic is more common in Part 2 of the book but appears with some regularity in Part 1 as well. Third, Keller assesses the philosophical assumptions that underlie the objections. Many of his answers to objections do not progress further than this because if his assessment can highlight a logical incoherency, he considers the objection to have no force. This is the case with most of the objections that come from a relativistic perspective, in which case Keller simply points out the self-contradictory features that he believes are intrinsic to his interlocutors’ relativism.
Fourth, if a case bears upon issues of historical or scientific fact—such as the objection having to do with historical injustices caused by the church—then Keller examines the relevant contexts. In such instances, he usually contrasts the historical evidence offered by the objection against the body of evidence that points in the opposite direction (as in, for instance, the historical case for the social good that Christianity has done). He also argues for the broad global appeal of Christianity in Chapter 3 but does not address the historical contexts of colonialism and Western imperialism that help to account for this trend, especially in comparison to other major faiths that he presents as more geographically limited.
The theme of The Insufficiency of Relativism appears prominently in this set of chapters, and particularly in Chapter 3. Relativistic assumptions lie behind the objection against Christianity’s exclusivity of membership. The objection holds that Christianity should accept all people regardless of their beliefs or practices, and the unspoken assumption is that all such personal beliefs are relative to their individual contexts and not subject to assessment by an external moral system. Keller pushes back against that assumption, noting that every community includes boundaries regarding beliefs and practices in order to maintain its identity as a community.
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