Thirteen Days

“Now, as the representatives of the CIA explained the U-2 photographs that   

morning, Tuesday, October 16, we realized that it had all been lies, one organic fabric of lies. The Russians were putting missiles in Cuba, and they had been shipping them there and beginning the construction of the sites at the same time those various private and public assurances were being forwarded by Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy.” 

Robert Kennedy describes the first meeting of the President’s advisory group, later officially called Ex Comm, and the reaction of the participants to the evidence that the Soviets have installed missiles in Cuba after publically pledging not to.

“They were men of highest intelligence, industrious, courageous, and dedicated to their country’s well-being. It is no reflection on them that none was consistent in his opinion from the very beginning to the very end. That kind of open, unfettered mind was essential.” 

Robert Kennedy describes the group of men who comprised what came to be known as Ex Comm, the President’s advisory group charged with developing the American response to the Soviet missiles in Cuba.

“Each one of us was being asked to make a recommendation which, if wrong and if accepted, could mean the destruction of the human race. That kind of pressure does strange things to a human being, even to brilliant, self-confident, mature, experienced men. For some it brings out characteristics and strengths that perhaps they never knew they had, for others the pressure is too overwhelming.” 

Robert Kennedy describes the stress that the advisory group was under as they struggled to devise a response to the missile crisis, and the toll this took on their interactions at meetings, where tempers flared and arguments became harsh.

“During all these deliberations, we all spoke as equals. There was no rank, and in fact, we did not even have a chairman…the conversations were completely uninhibited and unrestricted. Everyone had an equal opportunity to express himself and to be heard directly. It was a tremendously advantageously procedure that does not frequently occur within the executive branch of government, where rank is often so important.” 

Robert Kennedy describes the conduct at committee meetings and how this was freedom from the usual restraints of executive-branch meetings was critical to the process of developing a response to the crisis.

“He reminded them that once an attack began our adversaries could respond with a missile barrage from which many millions of Americans would be killed. That was a gamble that he was not willing to take until he had finally and forcefully exhausted all other possibilities. He told them this was an extremely hazardous undertaking and that everyone should understand the risks involved.” 

President Kennedy responds to Congressional leaders who were critical of a blockade as an ineffective response to the Soviet missiles in Cuba and wanted America to respond with military action.

“We went to bed that night filled with concern and trepidation, but filled also with a sense of pride in the strength, the purposefulness, and the courage of the President of the United States.” 

Robert Kennedy describes his experience, and that of other Americans, after the President’s televised speech informs the nation of the Cuban missiles and the American blockade of Cuba.

“There was a certain spirit of lightness–not gaiety certainly, but a feeling of relaxation, perhaps. We had taken the first step, it wasn’t so bad, and we were still alive.” 

Robert Kennedy describes the mood at the committee meeting the morning after President Kennedy’s speech announcing the blockade to the nation. 

“Neither side wanted war over Cuba, we agreed, but it was possible that either side could take a step that—for reasons of ‘security’ or ‘pride’ or ‘face’–would require a response by the other side, which, in turn, for the same reasons of security, pride, or face, would bring about a counter response and eventually an escalation into armed conflict.”

President Kennedy was determined to do everything possible to prevent war. He was very concerned that the crisis could quickly escalate out of control, as did the situation in Europe, prior to World War One. The President and his aides had been discussing the parallels between the Cuban Missile Crisis and the causes of World War One.

“The choice was to have gone in and taken steps which were not necessary or to have acted as we did. At least we now had the support of the whole Western Hemisphere and all our allies around the world.”

Robert Kennedy reflects on a conversation he had with the President about public perceptions of his decisions, in which they both agreed the President would have been impeached if he had failed to act.

“We stared at each other across the table. For a few fleeting seconds it was almost as though no one else was there and he was no longer the President.”

Robert Kennedy describes a moment in one of the tensest meetings of the committee when they are waiting for the first interception of a Russian ship at the blockade line. It is one of the few moments in the book when he writes about the President as his brother.

“One thousand miles away in the vast expanse of the Atlantic Ocean the final decisions were going to be made in the next few minutes. President Kennedy had initiated the course of events, but he no longer had control over them. He would have to wait–we would have to wait. The minutes in the Cabinet Room ticked slowly by. What could we say now–what could we do?”

Robert Kennedy describes the mood and tensions as the committee waited for what they believed was the imminent first interception of a Russian ship in the blockade.  

“Then we were back to the details. The meeting droned on. But everyone looked like a different person. For a moment the world had stood still, and now it was going around again.”

Robert Kennedy describes the reaction of the committee to hearing that the Russian ships have stopped approaching the blockade line and the anxiously anticipated interception, is, at least temporarily, forestalled.

“The feeling grew that this cup was not going to pass and that a direct military confrontation between the two great nuclear powers was inevitable. Both ‘hawks” and ‘doves’ sense that our combination of limited force and diplomatic efforts had been unsuccessful.” 

Here, we are offered the general feeling of the committee on Friday, October 26, after continued Soviet refusal to observe the blockade and continuing evidence that the Soviets were still working to develop missile sites towards completion, despite the efforts made by the U.S. thus far. 

“Armaments bring only disasters. When one accumulates them, this damages the economy, and if one puts them to use, then they destroy people on both sides. Consequently, only a madman can believe that armaments are the principal means in the life of society. No, they are enforced loss of human energy, and what is more for the destruction of man himself. If people do not show wisdom, then in the final analysis they will come to clash, like blind moles, and then reciprocal extermination will begin.”

Khrushchev wrote this in a letter to President Kennedy, at the peak of the crisis, commenting on the folly of initiating a nuclear conflict. This letter contained the first admission that Soviet missiles were in Cuba and offered a solution to the crisis: removing Soviet missiles in Cuba in exchange for America ceasing the blockade and pledging not to attack Cuba.

“They pointed out to the President that they had always felt the blockade to be too weak a course and that military steps were the only ones the Soviets would understand. They were not at all surprised that nothing had been achieved by limited force, for this is exactly what they had predicted.”

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend an air strike followed by an invasion of Cuba to the committee, following the receipt of the second, formal letter from Khrushchev, which proposes an exchange of Soviet missiles in Cuba for American missiles in Turkey.

“Again and again he emphasized that we must understand the implications of every step. What response could we anticipate? What were the implications for us? He stressed again our responsibility to consider the effect our actions would have on others.”

President Kennedy urges caution in response to the news that an American U-2 pilot has been shot down and killed by a surface to air missile in Cuba. The committee initially proposes a retaliatory attack on SAM sites in Cuba.

“Those hours in the Cabinet Room that Saturday afternoon in October could never be erased from the minds of any of us. We saw as never before the meaning and responsibility involved in the power of the United States, the power of the President, the responsibility we had to people around the globe who had never heard of our country or the men sitting in that room determining their fate, making a decision which would influence whether they would live or die.” 

Robert Kennedy reflects on the enormity of the responsibility and power the committee held and the dreadful burden they all felt for the devastation that could result from their decisions.

“He talked about Major Anderson and how it is always the brave and the best who die. The politicians and officials sit home pontificating about great principles and issues, make the decisions, and dine with their wives and families, while the brave and the young die.” 

President Kennedy, in a private conversation with Robert Kennedy, while waiting for his response to Khrushchev to be sent, reflects on the death of Major Anderson, the American U-2 pilot killed when his plane was shot down over Cuba. 

“The thought that disturbed him the most, and that made the prospect of war much more fearful than it would otherwise have been, was the specter of the death of the children of this country and all the world—the young people who had no role, who had no say, who knew nothing even of the confrontation, but whose lives would be snuffed out like everyone’s else’s. They would never have a chance to make a decision, to vote in an election, to run for office, to lead a revolution, to determine their own destinies.”

President Kennedy, in a private conversation with Robert Kennedy, contemplates the consequences for the world of a mistake or failure to resolve the missile crisis.

“He told me that the message was coming through that Khrushchev had agreed to dismantle and withdraw the missiles under adequate supervision and inspection; that everything was going to work out satisfactorily; and that Mr. Khrushchev wanted to send his best wishes to the President and to me.”

Robert Kennedy recalls the Russian Ambassador informing him that Krushchev had agreed to the American response and was withdrawing Russian missiles form Cuba, effectively ending the crisis.

“There is an important element missing when there is unanimity of viewpoint. Yet that not only can happen; it frequently does when the recommendations are being given to the President of the United States. His office creates such respect and awe that it has almost a cowering effect on men.”

Robert Kennedy reflects on the importance of presenting the President with a diversity of perspectives and opinions as one of the lessons learned from the way the committee functioned in the Cuban missile crisis.

“It was the vote of the Organization of American States that gave a legal basis for the quarantine. Their willingness to follow the leadership of the United States was a heavy and unexpected blow to Krushchev. It had a major psychological and practical effect on the Russians and changed our position from that of an outlaw acting in violation of international law into a country acting in accordance with twenty allies legally protecting their position.”

Robert Kennedy reflects on the lessons learned from the crisis, and specifically the pivotal role the OAS support had in establishing the validity of the blockade.

“During the crisis, President Kennedy spent more time trying to determine the effect of a particular course of action on Krushchev or the Russians than on any other phase of what he was doing. What guided all his deliberations was an effort not to disgrace Krushchev, not to humiliate the Soviet Union, not to have them feel they would have to escalate their response because their national security or national interests so committed them.” 

Robert Kennedy reflects on another lesson learned from the crisis and the importance of President Kennedy’s careful consideration of the Russian perspective at every step of the decision-making process.