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On Saturday morning, a “feeling of foreboding and gloom” dominated the meeting (71). The committee reviewed a new message from Khrushchev, an official communication from the Foreign Office of the Kremlin, very different in tone and feeling from the previous one. This message proposed that the Soviet Union would withdraw its missiles from Cubaif the United States withdrew its missiles from Turkey. The Russian request that America withdraw missiles from Turkey was in fact realistic. President Kennedy had previously asked the State Department to negotiate the removal of the outdated Jupiter missiles. However, the Turkish government would not consent to having them withdrawn. “The change in the language and tenor of the letters from Khrushchev indicated confusion in the Soviet Union; but there was confusion among us as well,” and as the committee attempted to devise a response, they learned that the Soviets were accelerating development of the missile sites (72).
The committee struggled to determine a course of action, aware that the Soviets were developing the missile sites as they deliberated, and that Turkey could also be a target for Soviet reprisals for an American military strike on Cuba. President Kennedy was concerned that the NATO countries did not understand their vulnerability even as they advocated a strong response to the Soviets. The Joint Chiefs of Staff argued for an air strike as the preliminary step in an invasion of Cuba, beginning on Monday.
A message arrived during the meeting that would “change the whole course of events and alter history” (73). The committee learned that an Air Force pilot flying surveillance was killed when his plane was shot down by a surface to air missile (SAM) over Cuba: “At first, there was almost unanimous agreement that we had to attack early the next morning with bombers and fighters and destroy the SAM sites” (74). However, President Kennedy urged caution and a thorough examination of all potential consequences of any proposed response. As a further precaution, the President “ordered preparations to defuse missiles with atomic warheads, so that he personally would have to give permission before they were used” (74). The President was also concerned about his responsibility to Turkey and America’s NATO allies, who could potentially endure catastrophic consequences as the result of his decision. In many ways, the future of the planet was in their hands.
The events of Saturday afternoon indelibly impressed on the committee the awesome responsibility they held for the fate of innocent people all over the world. The President decided not to order an air strike for the following day. The committee reviewed the State Department’s proposed response to Krushchev’s letter, which stated that the missiles in Turkey could not be withdrawn. Dissatisfied with the suggested draft, Robert Kennedy proposed disregarding the most recent Khrushchev response, and instead answering the offer made in the preceding, more personal letter: withdrawal of Soviet missiles in exchange for an American commitment not to attack Cuba. This provoked heated debate in the committee.
Robert Kennedy observed that “everyone was tense; some were already near exhaustion; all were weighted down with concern and worry. President Kennedy was the calmest” (77). The debate continued without resolution until the President, “with a note of some exasperation” at Robert Kennedy’s rejection of the State department’s proposed response, asked that he and Ted Sorenson leave the meeting and draft a different letter (77). They returned a short while later with a response to Krushchev’s earlier letter, which the President reviewed, and, after minor revisions, agreed to sign.
The letter agreed to Krushchev’s original proposal, on the condition that the first step “is for work to cease on offensive missile bases in Cuba and for all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use to be rendered inoperable” (78). The U.S. would then agree “to remove the quarantine measure now in effect, and to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba” (78). The letter went on to suggest that if both countries worked toward finalizing an agreement, they should be able to issue an official statement within days. Alluding to the Turkish missiles, the letter stated that resolving the Cuban crisis would allow consideration of an “arrangement regarding ‘other armaments’ as proposed in your second letter” (78). Kennedy expressed his commitment to “reducing tensions and halting the arms race,” while stressing the urgency of disabling the Cuban missiles (79).
Reflecting on the death of Major Anderson, the President remarked that it “is always the brave and best who die,” while the government leaders who make the decisions carry on with their lives (80). Discussing the mistakes that inadvertently precipitate a war, the President observed, “war is rarely intentional” (80). The President was concerned that the Soviets and the Americans were on course for war that neither wanted, and one he was determined to prevent. President Kennedy was most disturbed by the consequences a nuclear war held for the world’s children.
Robert Kennedy met with the Soviet Ambassador again. While stressing that the President had worked hard to avoid a war, Robert Kennedy was clear that if the Soviets fired at American planes, the U.S. would be forced into a military response, a situation that could quickly spiral out of control. He informed Dobrynin “that if they did not remove those bases, we would remove them” (82). Robert Kennedy told the Ambassador that America could not remove missiles from Turkey in the immediate crisis but suggested this could occur once the situation was resolved. Reiterating that the President wanted a peaceful resolution, he told Dobrynin that the Soviets had to respond by the following day.
Afterwards, at the White House, neither Robert Kennedy nor the President felt encouraged by the meeting. In anticipation of a military strike, the President activated the Air Force Reserve. The President had done all he could to avoid a conflict, and it was now up to Khrushchev to respond. However, “the expectation was for a military confrontation by Tuesday and possibly tomorrow” (83).
The next morning Robert Kennedy kept a longstanding commitment to take his daughters to a horse show (84). He learned that the Soviets were going to remove the Cuban missiles at 10 am. When Robert Kennedy returned to the White House, Ambassador Dobrynin requested a meeting at which he announced that Khrushchev “had agreed to dismantle and withdraw the missiles” (84) and also conveyed his “best wishes” (84). Later, as he was preparing to leave the White House, President Kennedy made a remark about attending the theater that night, a joking allusion to Abraham Lincoln, and Robert Kennedy replied that he would accompany him. When Robert Kennedy left the President, “was seated at the desk writing a letter…” (84).
As the Soviets continue work on the missile sites, the crisis seems to be moving inescapably toward war. The threat of nuclear catastrophe is ever-present, and the committee feels the enormous responsibility they carry for the fate of the world. President Kennedy’s leadership continues to be exemplified by caution and restraint, and a concerted effort to prevent war. Insisting that the potential consequences of each action be carefully thought out, the President tempers the committee’s initial reaction to retaliate with an air strike for the U-2 plane that was shot down. As military conflict appears imminent, President Kennedy issues orders that atomic missiles be defused to ensure they could not be fired without his permission.
Further complicating the situation, President Kennedy receives another letter from Khrushchev, distinctly official in tone, containing a different, less tenable proposal. Robert Kennedy tenaciously argues for responding to the more acceptable offer in the first letter, rejecting the State Department’s response to the second letter. As they wait for Krushchev’s response, hope for a peaceful resolution diminishes and military engagement is anticipated. The next morning, the Soviets accept the counteroffer. The Cuban Missile Crisis is effectively over.
President Kennedy remains notably calm, although solemn, as the crisis appears to devolving toward war, although President Kennedy is depicted exhibiting a wider range of emotion in this section, revealing more hints of his personality. Robert Kennedy notes that the President is “angry” that the obsolete American missiles that he requested be removed from Turkey are being used as leverage by the Russians (72). He also expresses “exasperation” at Robert Kennedy’s adamant opposition to the State Department response to Khrushchev.
President Kennedy’s response to Khrushchev indicated a willingness to go beyond resolving the missile crisis and expressed interest in “halting the arms race” (79). Following the Cuban Missile Crisis, both Khrushchev and Kennedy worked to reduce the threat of nuclear war. In August of 1963, the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom signed the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
At the end of the crisis, President Kennedy, alluding to Abraham Lincoln, makes a joke about attending the theater and Robert Kennedy says he will accompany him. This seems especially chilling to read today, in light of the fact that both John and Robert Kennedy were assassinated in the years following the crisis.
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