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Reflecting on the lessons learned from the crisis, Robert Kennedy observed that “the time that was available to the President and his advisors to work secretly, quietly, privately developing a course of action was essential” (85). Had the crisis been made public earlier, the committee would have had much less time to deliberate, analyze and argue about different options, which he felt would have significantly altered the course of events.
It was critical that the President was exposed to a range of perspectives and expertise from different individuals and government offices beyond the Cabinet level, including lesser officials with direct experience and specialized knowledge. To illustrate this point, Robert Kennedy offers an elaborate examination of how government departments and agencies have grown and evolved to manage an increasingly complex array of international relations and initiatives. President Kennedy “went to considerable lengths to ensure that he was not insulated from individuals because of rank or position” (89) and sought out “people who raised questions, who criticized, on whose judgment he could rely, regardless of their rank or viewpoint” (90).
The importance of providing a check on the military was another lesson derived from the Cuban crisis: “This experience pointed out for us all the importance of civilian direction and control and the importance of raising probing questions to military recommendations” (91). The military leaders’ pronounced tendency towards the use of force troubled the President, who thought, “they seemed to give so little consideration to the implications of the steps they suggested” (91).
The Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated “how important it was to be respected around the world, how vital it was to have allies and friends,” something Robert Kennedy stressed was important to remember, writing five years later, as isolationist sentiments were growing in the United States (92). Robert Kennedy observes that, historically, the United States has not always had strong relationships with the Latin-American countries, but during the missile crisis, formal support from the Organization of American States provided the United States with a legal justification for the blockade. NATO’s immediate and unwavering support, the result of a strong relationship with the U.S., was essential as well. Many African countries supported the US in the crisis, despite a history of difficult relations, out their respect and admiration for President Kennedy.
President Kennedy devoted considerable effort to understanding the situation from the Soviet perspective. This was an essential component of the effort to attain a peaceful resolution to the crisis, as well as a guiding principle of President Kennedy’s leadership. Repeatedly emphasizing the need for the committee to examine proposed actions from Krushchev’s point of view and appreciate the pressures he was under, the President made a concerted effort to give the Soviets enough time to consider their options and formulate a response. His decisions to support a blockade, rather than a military strike, and to order the Navy to board a non-Russian ship first, were strongly influenced by his desire to avoid provoking the Russians into a military confrontation. The President wanted to ensure that the Russians understood that the United States was not interested in starting a war or compromising Soviet security and was instead determined to remove the missiles from Cuba, as doing so was essential to the national security of the United States.
Ever mindful of the lessons of history, especially the events that lead to World War I, President Kennedy was also determined to avoid inadvertently initiating a chain of missteps that could ultimately culminate in war. The President understood that “miscalculation and misunderstanding an escalation on one side bring a counter response…For that is how wars begin–wars that no one wants, no one intends, and no one wins” (96). Every response to the Russians was evaluated for its potential to escalate the situation towards a military confrontation.
After the crisis was resolved, and out of respect for Khrushchev, President Kennedy “instructed all members of the Ex Comm and government that no interview should be given, no statement made, which would claim any kind of victory” (98). The President sought no recognition for the peaceful resolution of the missile crisis: “if it was a triumph, it was a triumph for the next generation, not for any particular government or people” (98).
The book ends with a note from Ted Sorenson stating that Robert Kennedy began the memoir based on his diaries and personal memories in 1967 and had intended to add a discussion of moral and ethical considerations, but he did not complete the book.
Many of the lessons learned in Robert Kennedy’s retrospective assessment echo and elaborate on observations he made in his chronicle of the day-to-day events of the missile crisis. He emphasizes the critical importance of the time the committee had to explore and analyze options before the crisis became public. Once the crisis became public and the whole world was watching, the pressure to act increased, as did the risks. Had the committee lacked the vital resource of time, Robert Kennedy believes the results may have been very different, although he does not specify what other outcomes might have prevailed.
The value of President Kennedy’s leadership style—which encouraged open and frank discussion, argument, and deliberation from a diversity of viewpoints that were crucial to formulating a course of action—reinforces a theme from earlier in the book. Robert Kennedy devotes an entire entry to explaining another key feature of the President’s leadership: the importance of understanding the other side’s perspective. The President’s appreciation for the pressures Khrushchev was under and his repeated appeals to the committee to consider their actions from the Russian’s perspective steered the crisis to a peaceful resolution, rather than a military engagement that risked escalating into a nuclear disaster.
While previously describing the committee’s deliberations between a blockade and a show of force, Robert Kennedy occasionally questioned the validity of some of the military recommendations and expressed apprehension about their potential results. Five years later, these concerns are more pronounced, as he directly and explicitly states the need for civilian oversight of the military.
Robert Kennedy stresses that the Cuban Missile Crisis proved the importance of American allies and support from other countries. In the midst of the crisis, the support of the OAS and Western European leaders is clearly acknowledged as essential to gaining international support for the blockade. This new emphasis is specifically in response to the growing isolationist sentiment Robert Kennedy discerns in 1967, resulting from the unpopularity of American involvement in Vietnam.
Ted Sorenson’s note at the end of the book that Robert Kennedy “never had the opportunity to rewrite or complete” the memoir refers to his assassination in June 1968 while campaigning for the presidency (98).
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