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Following two chapters on Asia, Kissinger moves on to analyze the United States, its role in the world, its self-perception, and its foreign policy styles up until World War II. Chapter 7 comprises the following categories: “America on the World Stage,” “Theodore Roosevelt: America as a World Power,” “Woodrow Wilson: America as the World’s Conscience,” and “Franklin Roosevelt and the New World Order.”
One key aspect of the American foreign policy is its complicated role:
[I]t expanded across a continent in the name of Manifest Destiny while abjuring any imperial designs; exerted a decisive influence on momentous events while disclaiming any motivation of national interest; and became a superpower while disavowing any intention to conduct power politics. America’s foreign policy has reflected the conviction that its domestic principles were self-evidently universal and their application at all times salutary; that the real challenge of American engagement abroad was not foreign policy in the traditional sense but a project of spreading values that it believed all other peoples aspired to replicate (234).
This messianic aspect of American foreign policy combined with its conviction in one’s own moral superiority is important to understanding American actions since the country’s inception. These aspects also stand in contrast to Europe, in which the questions of morality had traditionally been kept out of foreign policy and international relations. Even the 19th-century French noble Alexis de Tocqueville, who examined the American way of life, emphasized a number of so-called points of departure from the European ways.
This American conviction that its values are universal and exportable “introduced a challenging element into the international system because it implies that governments not practicing them are less than fully legitimate” (235-236). This type of thinking introduces an adversarial element to international relations, according to Kissinger.
As with other regions, Kissinger examines American history from the time of the country’s revolutionary birth. He also sees direct links between the specifics of American geography—being separated by two oceans—and the continent’s rich resources as definitive of the American approach to diplomatic relations. Kissinger calls the early American perception of foreign policy “a series of episodic challenges” (237) rather than a coherent system. Even after the United States eventually joined the ranks of the great powers, this perception did not change. Indeed, this change in status occurred through amassing land through its westward expansion and growing domestic power, which was unique.
Three specific presidents left a significant impact on shaping American foreign policy styles after it became a great power: Theodore “Teddy” Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR). Teddy Roosevelt perceived America as a world power. Wilson was an idealistic peacemaker. FDR, a cautious realist, helped propel the United States to the superpower status that the country attained after World War II.
Teddy Roosevelt believed that America was exceptional. His perception of foreign policy was to approach global power from the standpoint of national interest. Such perceptions pushed America out of isolation and into participating in the global order. The Panama Canal allowed the US to move its ships between the Atlantic and the Pacific. Roosevelt’s brokerage of the Treaty of Portsmouth in the wake of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) emphasized this new international role for America. This experience also made Roosevelt understand the need for an Asian equilibrium without allowing victorious Japan to get too strong.
In contrast to Teddy Roosevelt and his practical concerns, Kissinger calls Woodrow Wilson “the world’s conscience” (255). When he became President, Wilson wanted neutrality in international affairs. The United States finally entered World War I in 1917 “under the banner of moral universality not seen in Europe since the religious wars three centuries before” (256). Wilson believed that it was, in part, the pursuit of a power balance that led to this global war.
After the war, Wilson promoted the principle of self-determination because it is through self-government that people could “express their underlying will toward international harmony” (260). One important development after 1918 was the League of Nations, the predecessor of the United Nations, established to foster international cooperation. This organization was meant to be founded on moral principles, such as denouncing military aggression as such, rather than targeting specific threats. The League of Nations, according to Wilson, should focus on collective security, rather than alliances, “a legal construct addressed to no specific contingency” (263).
Finally, Kissinger discusses the challenges that the global order faced around the time of World War II. He believes that FDR surpassed Wilson in “spelling out his ideas of the foundation of international peace” (269). Kissinger describes FDR as a cautious and careful diplomat, particularly during his interactions with the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. For example, during the 1943 Tehran Conference, FDR sought to avoid making it seem like the Anglo-Saxon leaders, Britain and the US, “were ganging up against Stalin” (271).
A key challenge for these Allied conferences was the concept of postwar peace, including its principles and the relationship with the Soviet Union. The US only recognized that country in 1933 due to fears of its Communist ideology. Stalin believed that capitalism led to wars, that Hitler was the result of the capitalist system, and that the end of World War II was merely an armistice. For this reason, the Soviet Union—devastated by 27 million deaths and responsible for 80% of Nazi German war losses—pushed its borders as far west as possible after the war in pursuit of security. It was President Harry Truman, not FDR, who solidified the policy of dealing with the Soviet Union at this time.
In the first of the two chapters on American foreign policy, Kissinger covers the period from America’s birth until the end of World War II. This is a crucial formative time for the United States. It is at this time, that the general trajectory of American foreign policy, which has both practical and messianic components, is developed. This country was explicitly established as a unique experiment by the Founding Fathers so as to not repeat the mistakes of the Old World. Yet less than a half-century later, the United States already explicitly articulated the Monroe Doctrine (1823). Whereas the doctrine was meant to defend against further European colonization in the Western hemisphere, the young United States already claimed this large geographic area as its own sphere of influence.
Teddy Roosevelt expanded this doctrine with the Roosevelt Corollary (1904-1905) to allow a military intervention in the internal affairs of Latin American countries in the Western hemisphere. This period coincided with America’s imperialist expansion into the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam after the Spanish-American War. The period of an isolationist foreign policy was short-lived, and by the early-20th century, the United States operated like the other great powers of Europe.
Another important aspect of American foreign policy is its messianic, moralizing trajectory that developed at this time. The idea that the United States is destined—perhaps, even, divinely—to spread its values around the world can be traced back to Manifest Destiny. The term was articulated in the 1840s, but the concept was found in even earlier usage. American territorial expansion westward, which Kissinger claimed “inspired boundless optimism” (57) led to the ethnic cleansing of Native Americans from their lands. Later, the American belief in the universality of its values transformed into the export of freedom and democracy—malleable concepts—around the world. Kissinger finds this component of American foreign policy problematic:
This tenet—so ingrained in American thinking that it is only occasionally put forward as official policy—suggests that a significant portion of the world lives under a kind of unsatisfactory, probationary arrangement, and will one day be redeemed; in the meantime, their relations with the world’s strongest power must have some latent adversarial element to them. These tensions have been inherent since the beginning of the American experience (235-236).
Finally, Kissinger’s focus on Teddy Roosevelt, Wilson, and FDR mirrors his discussion of Bismarck and Metternich in 19th-century Europe. It is these three presidents whose different diplomatic styles set the tone for subsequent American foreign policy in the second half of the 20th century. Each postwar administration’s foreign policy featured some combination of Wilson’s idealism with Teddy Roosevelt’s realism and concern with the national interest.
In addition to these general categories, there are specific ways in which these three presidents impacted the realm of international relations. For example, “Wilson’s legacy has so shaped American thinking that American leaders have conflated collective security with alliances” (264). As a result, “[w]hen explaining the nascent Atlantic Alliance system after World War II to a wary Congress, administration spokesmen insisted on describing the NATO alliance as the pure implementation of the doctrine of collective security” (264). In general, Kissinger’s focus on particularly impactful statesmen is a modern version of the “great man in history” theory buttressed by other historic and geopolitical factors.
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